The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis

By Tatiana Nenova. 2003

1,065 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63fac5977693ee745c9a187920fbbb0114ebe560

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Should Business Groups be Dismantled? The Equilibrium Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets (2006, positive): “A large empirical literature provides evidence that private benefits of control are larger in poor investor protection countries (Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004).”
Ownership concentration in privatized firms: The role of disclosure standards, auditor choice, and auditing infrastructure (2006, result): “Consistent with this view, recent studies on the value of voting rights of large bock trades (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) and dualclass firms (Nenova, 2003) report significant control premiums, indicating high private benefits of control.”
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States (2010, neutral): “6 Lease, McConnell, and Mikkelson (1983; 1984); Zingales (1995); and Nenova (2003).”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “While the existence of private bene ts is widely documented (e.g., Doidge, 2004; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1995b), this does not imply that resources are allocated less e¢ ciently.”
Institutional Antecedents of Corporate Governance Legitimacy (2008, background): “Previous research has shown that as a national economy grows, the relative importance of corporate governance increases (Nenova, 2003; Schneper & Guillen, 2004).”
The value of control in emerging markets (2010, background): “7 Control-block votes are significantly less valuable in stricter legal environments (Nenova 2003).”
Corporate Governance, Principal‐Principal Agency Conflicts, and Firm Value in European Listed Companies (2012, neutral): “We include a number of country- and company-level variables that may affect the severity of the conflict (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Nenova, 2003).”
Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices (2006, neutral): “…relatively high investor protection, good law enforcement, and wide variation in ownership structure, expropriation is on average quite limited (see Nenova, 2003, and Dyck and Zingales, 2003).5 Moreover – and we would argue consequently – the involvement of domestic and foreign investors is high:6…”