Ownership concentration in privatized firms: The role of disclosure standards, auditor choice, and auditing infrastructure

By Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey A. Pittman. 2006

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c3768c1f3ed01b2fa15eb57603c8305bd5c27f5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

Citations in the corpus

Convergence of Accounting Standards and Foreign Direct Investment (2014, background): “Guedhami and Pittman (2006) report very weak evidence that extensive disclosure standards may reduce the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders while legal institutions disciplining auditors have a more definite influence, although the findings remain inconclusive.”
Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners (2009, background): “... firms: Megginson et al. (1994) with a sample of 61 firms from 18 countries, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) with a sample of 79 firms from 21 countries, D’Souza and Megginson (1999) with a sample of 78 firms from 25 countries, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) with a sample of 61 firms from 8 countries, ”
The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from Privatization (2013, unknown): “We complement Guedhami et al. (2009) sample by hand-collecting ownership structure and financial information from several data sources including Worldscope, BankScope, Asian, Brazilian, and Mexican Company Handbooks, Kompass Egypt Financial Year Book, and firms’ annual reports and offering prospectu”
Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence (2009, unknown): “Seventh, the corporate ownership literature argues that the firm’s ownership structure is endogenously determined by its contracting environment in ways consistent with value maximization (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Guedhami and Pittman, 2006).”
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “Moreover, these financial reporting incentives shift as the firm becomes more or less exposed to these political incentives over time, such as following privatization events (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman [2006] , Wang, Wong, and Xia [2008] , Guedhami, Pittman, and Saffar [2009] ).”
Family control and the implied cost of equity: Evidence before and after the Asian financial crisis (2010, background): “10Appendices in Hail and Leuz (2006) and Guedhami and Mishra (2009) provide a detailed description of the four models, including their assumptions and data requirements.”
Do state and foreign ownership affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations (2017, methodology): “(2004) and used in Guedhami and Pittman (2006). We classify countries in two subsamples according to whether their institutional score is below the country median (low) or above the country median (high).”