Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States

By Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick. 2010

607 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bdedbd1dbb29faad1b1e6ee595cdeb07c56d5604

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Citations in the corpus

Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Notable recent papers in this large literature include Gompers et al. (2003), which examines a range of takeover defenses and voting restrictions, Bebchuk & Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007), both of which focus on staggered boards, and Gompers et al. (2009), which studies dual-class voting structures.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: International Evidence (2011, neutral): “are only three previous studies that investigate whether a company’s CSR has an impact on firm value when standard corporate governance attributes are accounted for (Fisman, Heal, and Nair, 2006; Harjoto and Jo, 2008; Barnea and Rubin, 2010). 2 Another advantage of our GMI dataset is that it contain”
Government Control of Privatized Firms (2009, neutral): “Our variable is slightly different from the one used in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2006) .”
Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, background): “Similar results were also provided by Lemmon and Lins (2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. (2010).”
Does the identity of engagement partners matter? An analysis of audit partner reporting decisions (2015, methodology): “Following prior literature (Morck et al. 1988; Claessens et al. 2002; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003; Doidge et al. 2009; Gompers et al. 2010; Zerni et al. 2010), we measure the potential economic consequences of low auditor quality using Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the market value to replacement cost of t”
Dual class IPOs: A theoretical analysis (2012, result): “Consistent with these predictions, Gompers et al. (2010) find that media companies and companies with a person’s name in the company name are more likely to adopt dual class share structures.”
Do shareholders benefit from green bonds? (2018, background): “For example, list a few among others, Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011), Goss and Roberts (2011) and Chava (2014) shows that CSR and better environmental, social and governance (ESG) performances are associated with lower cost of loans, lower cost of capital, impr”
Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance (2014, neutral): “16 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Masulis et al. 2009; Gompers et al. 2010), we focus on the magnitude of the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights in our tests that compare dual class firms to a sample of propensity matched single class firms.”
Board Reforms and Firm Value: Worldwide Evidence (2017, neutral): “Our regression model also includes several additional firm-level, country-level, year- level, and industry-level control variables used in prior research to explain Tobin’s q (Aggarwal et al. 2009; Gompers et al. 2010; Doidge et al. 2004).”
Monitoring and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, neutral): “We include a company’s 11 See Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) for an in-depth analysis of the value-implications of the dual-class share structure.”
Board Hierarchy, Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China (2016, methodology): “Following prior research, we use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value (Yermack 1996; Vafeas 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2010; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2013).”
Do Independent Directors Cause Improvements in Firm Transparency (2014, methodology): “We reclassify directors labeled as “gray” 12 We identify firms with dual class shares using the data set described in, and provided by, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010).”
Ownership Structure and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Structural Estimation (2011, positive): “Corporate officers and directors often have voting rights substantially in excess of their cash-flow rights, and in many cases, have effective control over all corporate decisions with disproportionately small economic interest in the firm (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010).”
Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity (2014, neutral): “More specifically, it follows in the footsteps of Gompers et al. (2010), who attempt to assess the direct linkage between ownership structure and stock returns in U.S. dual-class firms.”