Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Portfolio Choices

By Mariassunta Giannetti, Andrei Simonov. 2006

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa75d162ee01246aee85e2251fe8eab00a87fa09

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital (2010, unknown): “Existing evidence suggests that investors are reluctant to hold shares in firms with poor corporate governance (Giannetti and Simonov (2006)).”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “For instance, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) document that investors shy away from rms that they associate with poor corporate governance, including dual-class rms.”
Equity market liberalization and corporate governance (2010, unknown): “Giannetti and Simonov (2006) find that foreign portfolio investors are less likely to invest in Swedish firms with weak governance.”
Do Foreigners Invest Less in Poorly Governed Firms (2009, background): “In contrast, another firm-level study of Swedish firms by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) finds that foreign investors are less likely to invest in a Swedish firm if its controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate outside investors.”
Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization (2009, background): “Interestingly, using individual shareholdings in Swedish companies, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) find that outside investors hold a smaller proportion of their portfolios in weak corporate governance firms.”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “Thus, in countries like Sweden, where family control is ubiquitous, but the legal environment and media awareness are strong, the measured value of control is likely to understate the value of private benefits of control substantially.34 There is another sample selection problem that is related to b”
Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, unknown): “Recent work by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) shows that institutions appear reluctant to invest in companies with weak corporate governance.”