Curbing Foreign Distributor Opportunism: An Examination of Trust, Contracts, and the Legal Environment in International Channel Relationships

By S. Tamer Cavusgil, Seyda Z. Deligonul, Chun Zhang. 2004

318 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63ca5abeaabf2b0bf46e8e7ae5768e2399675319

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Citations in the corpus

Impact of specific investments, governance mechanisms and behaviors on the performance of cooperative innovation projects (2017, background): “Second, as FCs specify cheating occasions and related punishments in written form, it serves as a reference point to judge the extent of opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004).”
Overcoming export manufacturers’ dilemma in international expansion (2007, methodology): “operationalization has been adopted in previous work (Cavusgil et al., 2004), and coefficient a for this five-item scale was 0.”
Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China (2009, background): “…and improving relationship performance for participating organizations (Barclay and Brock, 1997; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Cannon et al., 2000; Cavusgil et al., 2004; Heide and John, 1992; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005).”
Formal control and social control in domestic and international buyer–supplier relationships (2010, background): “Contracts are especially important in cross-border relationships because of pronounced differences in the recognition of rights, liabilities, and interpretations of the fine line between breach of contracts and tortuous acts (Cavusgil et al., 2004).”
The effects of supplier involvement and knowledge protection on product innovation in customer-supplier relationships: a study of global automotive suppliers in China (2014, background): “The literature highlights that trust is better at governing cross-border relationships, because physical and cultural distance undermines the ability of a formal contract to identify and cover each contingency (Cavusgil, Deligonul, and Zhang, 2004).”
Managing knowledge leakage in strategic alliances: The effects of trust and formal contracts (2013, background): “Surprisingly, although transaction cost analysis prescribes formal contracts as a governance mechanism, we do not find that they significantly affect knowledge leakage, perhaps becausewhen formal contracts are unenforceable (Cavusgil et al., 2004), they cannot significantly affect unintended knowled”