Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function*
By Michael C. Jensen. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2001
4,525 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract: In this article, I offer a proposal to clarify what I believe is the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which I call enlightened value maximization. Enlightened value maximization utilizes much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s objective. This proposal therefore solves the problems that arise from the multiple objectives that accompany traditional stakeholder theory. I also discuss the Balanced Scorecard, which is the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory, explaining how this theory is flawed because it presents managers with a scorecard that gives no score—that is, no single-valued measure of how they have performed. Thus managers evaluated with such a system (which can easily have two dozen measures and provides no information on the tradeoffs between them) have no way to make principled or purposeful decisions. The solution is to define a true (single dimensional) score for measuring performance for the organization or division (and it must be consistent with the organization’s strategy), and as long as their score is defined properly, (and for lower levels in the organization it will generally not be value) this will enhance their contribution to the firm.
Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6247ed1e6ea3a9b7a1e80dfb760c145bcee2ccdb
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- H. Jo
- Mike W. Peng
- George Serafeim
- M. Malik
- Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez
- Garry D. Bruton
- Bert Scholtens
- Ruth V. Aguilera
In Management Information Systems
- Kevin J. Murphy
- Eric G. Wruck
- M. Skitmore
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- D. Bosse
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In Strategy and Management
- H. Jo
- Bert Scholtens
- Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez
- Mike W. Peng
- Jennifer Martínez‐Ferrero
- George Serafeim
- M. Malik
- Lammertjan Dam
Citations in the corpus
- Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance (2008, background): “the demands of a wide set of stakeholders (Jensen, 2001; Tirole, 2000).”
- Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers (2013, neutral): “Thus, these theories suggest that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders in high CSR firms are in greater alignment than those of shareholders and other stakeholders in low CSR firms, and hence they are more likely to contribute to firms’ long-term profitability and efficiency (Jensen,”
- Advancing the Human Capital Perspective on Value Creation by Joining Capabilities and Governance Approaches (2015, background): “6 Some scholars defend shareholder governance even under incomplete and implicit contracting, arguing that shareholders have fewer contractual safeguards than other stakeholders (Hansmann, 1996; Jensen, 2001; Tirole, 2001).”
- Beyond Self-Interest Revisited (2006, neutral): “Multiple ends pose a problem to maximization techniques, because it is not possible to maximize in more than one dimension ( Jensen, 2002).”
- The social, economic and environmental dimensions of corporate social responsibility: The role played by consumers and potential entrepreneurs (2015, neutral): “and survive (Jensen, 2002).”
- Do shareholders benefit from green bonds? (2018, neutral): “However, due to the existence of externalities, Jensen (2001) argues firm’s maximizing behavior doesn’t necessarily indicate maximizing social welfare.”
- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Insurance Sector of Ghana (2012, background): “This situation has given managers the discretionary powers to decide on whose interest to serve (Jensen, 2001).”
- Doing Well or Doing Good: The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Profit in Romanian Companies (2018, background): “Therefore, the concept of creating share value by Kramer and Porter [9] is confirmed: the goal of a company is to create value and not just profit, and, to maximize this value, managers should make decisions on the long term, for all stakeholders [87].”
- ESG Importance for Long-Term Shareholder Value Creation: Literature vs. Practice (2021, background): “Additionally, Jensen (2002) contrasted the competing approaches and proposed a concept of “enlightened [long-term] value maximization”, which considers the company’s operations that also reflect the interests of all of its key stakeholders [22].”
- Corporate Social Responsibility and Access to Finance (2012, background): “In particular, research rooted in neoclassical economics argued that CSR unnecessarily raises a firm’s costs, putting the firm in a position of competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors (Friedman, 1970; Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Jensen, 2002).”
- Business-Conflict Linkages: Revisiting MNCs, CSR, and Conflict (2010, background): “There are many views, arguments and counterarguments presented regarding the role of business in society, ranging from the traditional neo-classical view associated with Friedman (1970) and contending that the business of business is business and hence profit maximization (Jensen, 2002; Margolis and”