Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
By Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer, Klaus M. Schmidt. Social Science Research Network, 2008
143 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/37758906dfbc23d00fb7f19682b3acc97d5641bf
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Citations in the corpus
- Renewable energy cooperatives as gatekeepers or facilitators? Recent developments in Germany and a multidisciplinary research agenda (2015, background): “This is shown by igh and efficient levels of investment under joint ownership in nvestment games [57].”
- Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods (2015, unknown): “We are not aware of any joint distribution of inequality-aversion parameters for the F&S model with the exception of Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt (2008), who assume that there are 60 percent players with a ¼ b ¼ 0 and 40 percent fair types with a ¼ 2 and b ¼ 0.6, which seems too coarse for our…”