Exploring the Agency Consequences of Ownership Dispersion Among The Directors of Private Family Firms

By W. Schulze, M. Lubatkin, Richard N. Dino. 2003

1,017 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f1c211c85d3cf3a8bb8c6205dddcadf6b15a584

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Collateral, relationship lending and family firms (2010, result): “This result was more consistent with the dark side of the altruism idea of private family ownership ( Schulze et al. 2003 ), giving support to the thesis that the relationship between shareholders and bondholders is characterized by more severe agency conflicts in private family firms.”
Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses (2011, background): “, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), and have suggested reasons ranging from misplaced altruism to executive incompetence (Schulze et al., 2003).”
The role of family ownership in international entrepreneurship: exploring nonlinear effects (2012, background): “Increasing family size, geographical distribution, and ownership dispersion usually coming along with generational transition (Schulze et al. 2003) could give strong incentives to pursue international entrepreneurship opportunities.”
Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view (2012, background): “Considering the significant differences between founder-controlled and descendant-controlled firms ( Schulze et al., 2003a, 2003b; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), we believe it is necessary to differentiate different types of CEOs and examine how they influence firm performance.”
Affiliate Directors and Perceived Risk Bearing in Publicly Traded, Family–Controlled Firms: The Case of Diversification (2008, neutral): “industries (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003a ).”
Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, background): “…have often been seen as typical limiting family practices within an agency perspective (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1986; Lubatkin, Durand, & Ling, 2007; Schulze et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2001; Volpin, 2002).”