Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate*

By L. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen. Journal law and economy, 2003

292 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5df0e0b84fcf7a0b259b22c140bfe0c133449e3a

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance Convergence : Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe (2005, background): “Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) show that the real reason to incorporate in another state is that companies are attracted to the states that provide managers with a wider range of anti-takeover measures.”
The Effect of State Antitakeover Laws on the Firm's Bondholders (2010, unknown): “Similar to Bebchuk and Cohen (2003), we use five dummy variables representing the groups of states with 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 antitakeover statutes in place, denoted as S0, S1, S2, S3 and S4, respectively, instead of the Unrestrictive and Moderately Restrictive state dummies.”
The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2016, background): “An important feature of the U.S. corporate landscape is that more than half of U.S. public companies are incorporated in Delaware (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen 2003, p. 389).”
Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm (2011, methodology): “Following Romano (1987), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), or Bebchuk and Cohen (2003), we also consider the effects of state-level antitakeover laws.”
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment (2011, background): “Recent studies exploiting cross-state analysis include Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Wald and Long (2006).”
Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation (2009, unknown): “Consistent with the entrenchment effects of the regime shift, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that staggered-board firms generally have lower valuations after 1995. In addition, Rauh (2006) finds that managers respond to this change in the Delaware takeover regime by decreasing managerial and pension-”
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “…of studies that examine the relation between corporate governance and firm decision, firm value or firm performance include Bhagat and Black, 1998b; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Carter, Simkins, Simpson, 2003; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003, Johnson and Rao, 1997; Karpoff…”
Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence (2014, unknown): “From (1), it follows that: PX(2) = PX(1) + e X + X e z2, (7)”
The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (2008, background): “12 higher, while Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) find evidence that states with greater antitakeover protection attract more incorporations.”
The Disappearing Delaware Effect (2004, methodology): “It is consistent with Bebchuk & Cohen (2002), who find no correlation between Tobin’s Q and Delaware incorporation for a sample of exchange-traded firms in 1999.”
Exploring the Role Delaware Plays as a Domestic Tax Haven (2013, background): “decision of where to subsidiary operations, following Bebchuk and Cohen (2003). We analyze the number of disclosed material operations, which is our proxy for the number of subsidiaries of”