Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
By Mark J. Garmaise. 2011
520 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/617f5f2d0da04d4194bcfb801114894bf77e8d89
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Citations in the corpus
- The effects of proprietary information on corporate disclosure and transparency: Evidence from trade secrets (2018, unknown): “Noncompete Enforcement Index The noncompete enforcement index developed by Garmaise (2009).”
- How Anticipated Employee Mobility Affects Acquisition Likelihood: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2015, methodology): “A detailed, geographic breakdown of operations by state was unavailable for most firms in our sample, and we therefore followed prior research (e.g., Garmaise, 2011) and assigned firms to the treatment group (Michigan) versus the comparison group by referring to a firm’s corporate headquarters (not…”
- Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans ☆ (2009, unknown): “However, the efficacy of non-compete agreements varies as states differ in their enforcement of these contracts (see Garmaise 2006). Garmaise (2006) finds that executive compensation in firms located in states in high enforcement regimes are more likely to be tilted in favor of salary.”
- Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, unknown): “Enforceability is a statelevel enforcement index of non-competition clauses included in employment contracts, which is obtained from Garmaise (2011).”
- Do non‐competition agreements lead firms to pursue risky R&D projects? (2014, methodology): “These non-competes significantly limit outbound mobility to competitors (Garmaise, 2011; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 2009) and are widely used in contracts with scientists, engineers, and technology executives.”
- Do General Managerial Skills Spur Innovation? (2017, methodology): “Consistent with this idea, Garmaise (2009) finds that executive job transfers within an industry decline with the level of noncompete enforceability faced by the firm, while transfers between industries rise.”
- Employment Protection, Investment, and Firm Growth (2019, background): “We also contribute to work showing that employment laws can have a substantial effect on various corporate policies and valuation (e.g., Matsa, 2010; Garmaise, 2011; Acharya et al., 2014; Griffith and Macartney, 2014; Simintzi et al., 2015; Loderer, Waelchli, and Zeller, 2016; Serfling, 2016).”
- Why are some regions more innovative than others? The role of small firms in the presence of large labs (2014, unknown): “To construct a non-compete enforcement index, we follow Garmaise (2011) and construct a measure based on the twelve enforcement dimensions studied by Malsberger (2004). The index assigns one point to each dimension in which the jurisdiction law exceeds a given threshold; its value varies from zero t”