Endogeneity and the Dynamics of Internal Corporate Governance

By M. Babajide Wintoki, James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter. 2012

2,874 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5d0bca39b02e7d4873d09f27c4c147623ff74313

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In Accounting

1. Collins G. Ntim
2. Jinhua Cui
3. S. Locke
4. Tuan Nguyen
5. Ahmed A. Elamer
6. K. Reddy
7. S. F. Shah
8. S. Akbar

In Economics and Econometrics

1. K. Reddy
2. Tuan Nguyen
3. S. Locke
4. Kevin Keasey
5. Sabur Mollah
6. O. Faleye
7. H. Vu
8. Tuan V. Nguyen

Citations in the corpus

• Family Firms, Employee Satisfaction, and Corporate Performance (2015, background): “Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) propose a dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns.”
• The impact of intellectual capital on firm performance: a study of Indian firms listed in COSPI (2018, methodology): “The 16-year period was selected because system generalized method of moments (SGMM) may produce biased results when the data set is too small (Wintoki et al., 2012) and because most research on IC has been performed from the year 2000 onward (Firer and Mitchell Williams, 2003; Chan, 2009a, b; Sardo ”
• Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector (2017, methodology): “We therefore follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and employ a dynamic panel system-GMM for controlling all three types of endogeneity, i.e., simultaneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and dynamic endogeneity.”
• Do Corporate Governance Characteristics Influence Tax Management (2010, methodology): “To test what effect governance has on taxmanagement, we examine tax rates in amultivariate analysis using the average of the tax rates over five years using a system GMM estimator with lags to control for endogeneity as in Wintoki et al. (2010).”
• Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, background): “…with the crisis period being a unique setting in which the actions of board members mattered.6 6 One common problem for governance studies is that the relation between board characteristics and firm performance may be spurious because they are endogenously determined (Wintoki et al., 2012).”
• Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach (2015, methodology): “…at mitigating potential endogeneity problems regarding the association between executive compensation and corporate performance by estimating fixedeffects and lagged structure models, Wintoki et al. (2012) suggest that the relationship may still be confounded by the presence of dynamic endogeneity.”
• Estimating Dynamic Panel Models in Corporate Finance (2013, positive): “To verify that this modification induces the desired endogeneity, we follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and use the Wooldridge (2009) test of exogeneity.”
• Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, neutral): “Currently, there is mixed evidence as to whether directors that own stocks have the incentive to engage in the companies’ operations more diligently [Yermack (2004)] or not [Core et al.”
• Corporate social responsibility, board of directors, and firm performance: an analysis of their relationships (2014, background): “This hypothesis is based on the idea that firms’ managers may pursue their own private objectives, even to the detriment of the firm’s other stakeholders (Williamson 1985).”