Sorting in Experiments with Application to Social Preferences

By Edward P. Lazear, Ulrike Malmendier, Roberto A. Weber. 2019

344 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7955d87cd2dc88084ec2e456c2278960bfc8f633

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Tore Ellingsen
2. Magnus Johannesson
3. Nava Ashraf
4. O. Bandiera
5. David J. Cooper
6. Daniel J. Lee
7. John H. Kagel
8. Oliver Hart

In General Decision Sciences

1. Nava Ashraf
2. David J. Cooper
3. Daniel J. Lee
4. Magnus Johannesson
5. John H. Kagel
6. Sonja Pointner
7. David G. Rand
8. Tore Ellingsen

In Safety Research

1. David G. Rand
2. Nava Ashraf
3. Anna Dreber
4. Tore Ellingsen
5. Magnus Johannesson
6. David J. Cooper
7. O. Bandiera
8. John H. Kagel

Citations in the corpus

• Racial bias and the validity of the Implicit Association Test (2016, background): “Of them, Lowes et al. (2015) find evidence of ethnic homophily while Reuben et al. (2014) and Rooth (2010) find predictive evidence of negative hiring conditions.”
• No Margin, no Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for public service delivery (2014, background): “This reconciles our finding that incentives do not affect the selection of agents into the job with earlier evidence from the private sector and from the laboratory that suggests substantial selection effects (Bandiera et al., 2007; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Larkin and Leider, 2012; Lazear, 2000; Lazea”
• Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games (2012, background): “Likewise, the model explains why people are willing to pay for quietly exiting the Dictator game rather than going through with their initial allocation, as documented by Dana et al. (2006); see also Broberg et al. (2007) and Lazear et al. (2012).”
• Other Regarding Preferences: A Selective Survey of Experimental Results (2012, background): “HLW attribute this result to a selection effect of the sort identified in Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012), with subjects who are comfortable giving minimal amounts to the recipient not risking the possibility that their agent will behave too kindly.”
• Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value (2017, background): “In Lazear et al. (2012), half of the subjects exhibit a preference for avoiding a situation where they must decide whether to share the proceeds of a game.”
• Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving (2017, unknown): “Laboratory experiments on the dictator games also provide a frame that allows individuals to “allocate” money to another player, and when players are allowed to make requests from each other, the ask greatly increases donations (Andreoni and Rao, 2011), whereas total donations drop when dictators ca”