CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures

By David Aboody, Ron Kasznik. 2000

1,090 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/580e42c0c59b4bc5d0bd61a59eca8c66886a1f47

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In Accounting

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In Finance

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Citations in the corpus

• Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “…of BD-related issues took several years and resulted in substantial 6 A number of studies had already documented a systematically favorable stock price pattern around executive option grants (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam, 2004).”
• Accounting disclosure and firms' financial attributes: Evidence from the UK stock market (2008, background): “Firms are usually more eager to disclose good information, while they tend to delay the announcement of bad information (Aboody & Kaznik, 2000).”
• Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123? (2006, background): “The executive compensation literature finds that although managers make financial reporting and disclosure decisions that increase their compensation (e.g., Healy, 1985; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000), they also attempt to minimize investors' perception of its magnitude.”
• Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements (2011, neutral): “Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show empirically that disclosure decisions are also affected to an extent by option-like payoffs for CEOs.”
• Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, neutral): “Likewise, where incentives are geared to market returns, information released to the market may be manipulated so as to artificially inflate or deflate the company’s share price (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).”
• Theories and Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure (2014, background): “Two reasons justify this motivation: first, managers will have incentives to reduce contracting costs associated with stock compensation for new employees when they act in the interest of existing shareholders (Aboody & Kasznik, 2000).”
• Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives (2003, background): “For example, option awards occurring just after the completion of fiscal year t are reported in the proxy statement as year t + 1 compensation, even though the award is most likely related to year t performance (Murphy [1999]). We find that 60 percent of the option awards in our sample occurred in t”
• Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, neutral): “Aboody and Kasznik (2003) find”
• Don't Believe the Hype: Local Media Slant, Local Advertising, and Firm Value (2012, neutral): “Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that managers accelerate bad news and/or withhold good news in the period immediately preceding option grant dates to lower the exercise price of the options and thus increase the value of their option-grant portfolios.”