Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?

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Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, unknown): “This action is more likely where the firm’s option expense is larger and also where there is weaker CG (Aboody et al., 2006).”
Is fair value accounting information relevant and reliable? Evidence from capital market research (2007, background): “As noted above, the findings in Aboody et al. (2006), which indicate that managers select model parameters to manage estimates of disclosed employee stock option fair values, raise the broader question of whether managers will behave similarly when selecting model parameters for fair value…”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, background): “In the case of employee stock options (ESOs), for example, there is evidence that managers manipulate estimated model inputs to reduce the estimated fair value and thus the potential adverse income statement effects (Aboody et al., 2006; Bartov et al., 2007).”
The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing (2009, background): “…of executive pay (Dechow et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2002), (ii) disavow (Blacconiere et al. 2004) and manage downward the option expense disclosed (Aboody et al. 2006) or recognized (Johnston 2006) under SFAS 123, and (iii) have poorer voluntary disclosure of compensation practices in the proxy…”