Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

By W. Dugger. 2005

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5667decbf1b1547ea53cde7c1a68cb2ed858581c

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003, background): “To adequately understand the landscape of executive compensation, however, it is necessary to recognize that the design of compensation schemes is also partly a product of this same agency problem.”
Top Incomes and the Great Recession: Recent Evolutions and Policy Implications (2013, unknown): “In particular, executives can be overpaid if they are entrenched and use their power to in uence compensation committees (Bebchuk and Fried (2004) survey the wide corporate nance literature on this issue).”
Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, unknown): “This concern prompted the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is also reflected in a much discussed book by Bebchuk and Fried (2004).”
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, unknown): “Princeton University, Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, National Bureau of Economic Research, Centre for Economic Policy Research, and Institute for the Study of Labor ðIZAÞ”
CEO Investment cycles (2016, background): “See Jensen and Murphy (1990), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Boot (1992), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), and Bebchuk and Fried (2004).”
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “This perspective, espoused most prominently by Bebchuk and Fried (2004), has been taken very seriously by both scholars and policymakers, and led to major regulatory changes.”
Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance (2010, unknown): “A parallel, though surprisingly thin, literature on corporate ﬁnance and law examines how corporate board members beneﬁt from their positions at the expense of the larger company (Bebchuk and Fried 2004; Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006).”
The choice of corporate liquidity and corporate governance (2009, background): “From a broad perspective, results of this paper complement the growing literature relating corporate governance to firm value (Blanchard et al., 1994; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Harford, 1999; and Pinkowitz et al., 2006).”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, background): “From (5), the two EF conditions are E2 [ ∂U ∂r1 ] ≥ g′ (a∗) and E2 [ ∂U ∂r2 ] ≥ g′ (a∗), i.”
How Ownership and Corporate Governance Influence Chief Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms (2007, methodology): “The absence of executive stock options removes one method of aligning the interests of managers and the shareholders (we note, however, that the use of stock options in the U.S. has been subject to criticism (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004)).”