Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud

By Eugene Kang. 2008

294 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54d54d2e0053d476f225d2993c08d80eec2faa60

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Citations in the corpus

Acquisition Announcements and Stock Market Valuations of Acquiring Firms’ Rivals: A Test of the Growth Probability Hypothesis in China (2011, unknown): “…industry concentration and rival firms’ CAR would be stronger 7 This is not conclusive evidence for Hypothesis 1, but our approach matches other management studies that use event studies (e.g., Eden, Valdez, and Li, 2005; Gubbi et al., 2010; Kang, 2008; Uhlenbruck, Hitt, and Semadeni, 2006).”
Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion (2013, methodology): “Other studies of spillover effects of restatements to non-restating firms include Srinivasan (2005), Kang (2008), and Gleason et al.”
Romancing leadership: Past, present, and future ☆ (2011, background): “…outside of their control Declining firm performance is seen as a call for new leadership (leader " spoiled image " ) Haunschild and Miner (1997); Kang (2008); Salancik and Meindl (1984) D'Aveni (1990); Morrow et al. (2004); Sanders (2001); Sutton and Callahan (1987) Mechanisms for…”
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011, background): “Strategy researchers have also considered receivers that are existing shareholders, potential investors, or both (Kang, 2008; Park & Mezias, 2005), but they have also given attention to a broader array of stakeholders, such as consumers, competitors, and employees (Basdeo et al., 2006; Carter,…”
Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, background): “The consequences of misconduct on both internal and external labor markets may be even stronger for directors than for executives, as the board is ultimately responsible, by legal definition, for organizational misconduct (Gove & Janney, 2004; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985; Zahra & Pearce, 1989)”
Investor reaction to women directors (2010, background): “Given that investors do rely on signals from firms to make investment decisions (Kang, 2008; Sanders and Boivie, 2004), they are likely to react positively to the appointment of women directors to the extent that work-force diversity is a source of competitive advantage for firms (Richard, 2000).”
The Impact of Corporate Reputation and Reputation Damaging Events on Financial Performance: Empirical Evidence from the Literature (2015, background): “…(Karpoff et al., 2005), financial misrepresentation (Karpoff et al., 2008), financial reporting fraud along with spillover effects due to interlocking directors (Kang, 2008), and allegations of different illegal activities (e.g. fraud, bribery) in Alexander (1999) and Murphy et al. (2009).”
Foreign subsidiary CSR as a buffer against parent firm reputation risk (2020, background): “Compared with other types of spillovers examined in previous literature (Kang, 2008; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012), parent–subsidiary spillover effect is especially strong, due to MNEs’ high level of visibility (Caves, 1996), strong headquarters–subsidiary link (Doz & Prahalad, 1981),…”