Ownership Structure, Expropriation, and Performance of Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea

By Sea-Jin Chang. 2003

523 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5244cf045e6bb7fc63b1fbb1e67a9f68de14db1d

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Citations in the corpus

Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “…conflicts wherein some large owners extract the benefits of control at the expense of minority owners through the use of pyramid structures, cross-ownership, and/or dual-class equity mechanisms (Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis, 2000; Chang, 2003; Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2005).”
Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan (2005, methodology): “Following Claessens et al. (2000) and Chang (2003) the membership of the controlling family is identified by linking corporate insiders including CEO, board chairman, honorary chairman and vice chairman of the company that share a common family name with the CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE IN”
From diversification premium to diversification discount during institutional transitions (2008, background): “The government pushed many chaebols to list some of their member firms (Chang, 2003a ).”
Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation (2008, background): “The latter, newer research stream, however, has mostly focused on aspects of ownership structure other than ownership concentration per se, such as insider ownership (Chang, 2003; Lins and Servaes, 2002) and the presence of large shareholders (Claessens et al.”
Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence (2012, background): “6 Chang (2003) examines the simultaneous relationship between ownership and firm performance for chaebol affiliates.”
When Does Prior Experience Pay? Institutional Experience and the Multinational Corporation (2014, unknown): “I also included an indicator variable of whether the subsidiary was affiliated with a business group (0/1), as previous studies have revealed that business group affiliations can affect firm performance (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Chang, 2003; Khanna and Thomas, 2009).”
What determines the scope of the firm over time and around the world? An Asia Pacific perspective (2007, background): “Chang (2003) , Chang and Hong (2000, 2002), Chang et al. (2006), Kim”
The Value-relevance of Earnings and Book Value, Ownership Structure, and Business Group Affiliation: Evidence From Korean Business Groups (2007, unknown): “Chang (2003) provides evidence that controlling shareholders of chaebols use inside information to increase their shares of more profitable firms and transfer profits to other affiliates through intra-group trading.”
An institution-based view of international business strategy: a focus on emerging economies (2008, unknown): “…, if implemented in emerging economies, is likely to be disastrous, because the main problem there is that controlling shareholders usually already have had too much concentrated ownership and control rights, which allow some of them to potentially expropriate minority shareholders (Chang, 2003).”
Guest Editors' Introduction Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom* (2005, unknown): “Chang (2003) suggests that concentrated ownership may create an incentive for the family owners to expropriate wealth from the subsidiary businesses of a large diversified business group.”
Earnings Management and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Groups (2003, background): “…transactions in earnings management, although quite a lot of anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem might be serious in transition economies like China.7 The exceptions include Chang (2002), which finds that Korean firms use related party purchases and sales to suppress or inflate earnings.”