Blockholders and Corporate Governance

By Alex Edmans. 2014

462 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c2e77704cb0b26638538ce7929fd12011b49c266

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Citations in the corpus

The effects of stock liquidity on firm value and corporate governance: Endogeneity and the REIT experiment (2015, background): “As such, governance is more effective under multi-firm ownership than under a single-firm benchmark (Edmans, 2014).”
Institutional investors' horizons and corporate employment decisions (2020, unknown): “Therefore, it is 13 Edmans (2014) provides a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders in corporate governance. important to control for the separate effect of block ownership in our regressions in order to alleviate this concern.”
Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2017, unknown): “As shown in a survey by Edmans (2014), a large number of papers have studied the impact upon shareholder activism of either or both of these forces, and certain models predict either greater or lesser involvement by major shareholders in corporate governance when either transparency or liquidity is…”
Ties that Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism (2016, unknown): “At the most general level, our paper relates to the role of blockholders in corporate governance (see Edmans (2013) for a survey) and the emerging literature on how the incentives of institutional blockholders a↵ect governance (e.g., Dasgupta and Piacentino (2015)).”
Corporate social responsibility, firm value, and influential institutional ownership (2018, background): “Our results 5 Edmans (2014) provides a great review on blockers and corporate governance.”
Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, background): “Given the dramatic increase in ownership by passively managed index funds, and since index funds are now the largest blockholders of many U.S. corporations (Azar et al. (2018)), studying their monitoring incentives is of fundamental importance (Edmans (2014)).”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “This chapter builds on and significantly expands two earlier survey papers on blockholders, Holderness (2003) and Edmans (2014).”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “Typically, institutional investors, such as blockholders, are thought to influence governance through a combination of “voice” and “exit” (e.g., Edmans (2014) and Levit (2013)).5 Voice refers to direct intervention by shareholders through either formal (e.g., proxy voting) or informal (e.g.,…”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “As Edmans (2014) observes, identifying a causal effect of shareholder activism on firm governance is difficult since changes in ownership structure may be the result of changes in expected firm profits, instead of being the cause of them.”