Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing

By S. Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan. Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory, 2010

548 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f4a70706f058817ec8b959673d0e830dd296935c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Haim Kaplan
2. Yossi Azar
3. Ashish Chiplunkar
4. Pablo D. Azar
5. S. Matthew Weinberg
6. Robert D. Kleinberg
7. Andreas Krause
8. Adish Kumar Singla

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Robert D. Kleinberg
2. Andreas Krause
3. Adish Kumar Singla
4. Haim Kaplan
5. Pablo D. Azar
6. Yossi Azar
7. Ashish Chiplunkar
8. S. Matthew Weinberg

In Safety Research

1. Andreas Krause
2. Adish Kumar Singla
3. S. Matthew Weinberg
4. Pablo D. Azar
5. Robert D. Kleinberg

Citations in the corpus

• Matroid prophet inequalities (2012, methodology): “[5] discovered a much subtler relation between the two subjects: questions about the approximability of offline Bayesian optimal mechanisms by sequential posted-price mechanisms could be translated into questions about prophet inequalities, via the use of virtual valuation functions.”
• Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1-1/e Barrier (2017, background): “For more information on posted price mechanisms for online arrival of buyers, see [9, 3, 2, 4], and the references therein.”
• Submodular function maximization via the multilinear relaxation and contention resolution schemes (2011, methodology): “[11, 12] implicitly contains a(b, 1 − b)-balanced deterministic scheme for matroids; their motiva tion for considering this notion was mechanism design.”
• Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information (2013, methodology): “11 We remark that our definition matches that of [18], which extends the one given in [6].”
• Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015, unknown): “Recent examples include the work of Segal ( 2003 ) , Micali and Valiant ( 2008 ) , Chawla et al. ( 2010 ) , and Chassang ( 2013 ) .”
• Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms (2013, background): “[16] further extend the online posted price mechanisms for multi-parameter domains.”
• Prophet Secretary (2015, background): “[11] pioneered the study the approxim ability of a special class of such mechanisms, sequential posted pricing (SPM): the seller makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it o ffers to agents, offering an item for a specific price.”