Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation

By Roman M. Sheremeta. 2009

257 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b0c768a84bc0ddc692aa522dd5f957e07bcdcddd

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In General Decision Sciences

1. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Emmanuel Dechenaux
4. Roman M. Sheremeta

In Safety Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
4. Roman M. Sheremeta
5. Shakun D. Mago
6. Anya Samak

Citations in the corpus

• A generalized Tullock contest (2011, methodology): “and Sheremeta, R.M. (2010). A generalized Tullock contest.”
• Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “Replicating other studies (e.g., Sheremeta 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta 2011, 2015), we find that nonmonetary utility of winning can explain the significant overexpenditure of effort (result 1).”
• Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, unknown): “Sheremeta (2011) shows how quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which accounts for individual errors, can explain some of the over-dissipation observed in lottery contests.”
• Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests (2010, result): “This finding is consistent with previous experimental studies of Davis and Reilly (1998), Sheremeta (2010b) and Sheremeta and Zhang (2010).”
• Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence (2013, unknown): “…overbidding in contests are done by Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998), Sheremeta (2010, 2011), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Price and Sheremeta (2011, 2013), Cason et al. (2012), Chowdhury et al. (2012), Lim et al. (2012), Mago et al. (2012, 2013), and Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013).”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Contests have been commonly used in the study of R&D races and political or rent-seeking competitions (Millner and Pratt, 1989; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Morgan et al., 2012).”
• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “The equilibrium is not in pure strategies when r is relatively large (Baye et al. 1994), and it is not unique when there are externalities of effort (Chowdhury and Sheremeta 2011b).”
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests (2009, background): “3 Several researchers have offered explanations for such behavior based on non-monetary utility of winning (Parco et al., 2005), misperception of probabilities (Baharad and Nitzan, 2008), quantal response equilibrium, and heterogeneous risk preferences (Goeree et al., 2002; Sheremeta, 2009).”
• Fight or Flight? (2012, unknown): “…other possible explanations, proposed in the literature, include subjects having a nonmonetary value of winning (Sheremeta 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta 2011), having spiteful preferences (Herrmann and Orzen 2008) or making mistakes (Potters et al. 1998; Sheremeta 2011) and judgmental biases…”
• SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS (2013, unknown): “…Sheremeta (2010a; 2010b; 2011) and Sheremeta and Zheng (2010) cite noise and errors, probability judgment biases, and a non-monetary utility of winning as explanations for overbidding. previous experimental findings on contests (e.g., Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2011).”