Developmental State and Corporate Governance in China

By Victor Nee, Sonja Opper, Sonia M. L. Wong. Management and Organization Review, 2007

188 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4a00535b5cfe9868b8637da26ed64e39eb4bbaa4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. H. Hu
2. M. Tan
3. Dean Xu
4. Phillip H. Phan
5. Xiaowei Rose Luo
6. Ho‑fung Hung
7. Danqing Wang
8. Yiyi Su

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Dean Xu
2. Xiaowei Rose Luo
3. Ho‑fung Hung
4. Danqing Wang
5. Yuan Lu

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Dean Xu
2. Xiaowei Rose Luo
3. Ho‑fung Hung
4. Danqing Wang
5. O. Tam
6. Yuan Lu

Citations in the corpus

• Organizational slack and corporate social performance: Empirical evidence from China’s public firms (2015, background): “In China’s transition economy, the state plays multiple roles in firms and society not only as a policy maker and regulator, but also as the owner of strategic assets in SOEs (Ma et al., 2006; Nee, 2000; Nee et al., 2007).”
• Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation (2008, background): “Such a conjecture has had some empirical backing from other researchers, who found a negative performance effect resulting from direct state intervention in corporate decisions (Nee, Opper, and Wong, 2007).”
• Rise of China and the global overaccumulation crisis (2008, background): “They promote local development through such classical developmental state measures as making discriminatory rules and constructing appropriate infrastructure to facilitate the growth of select industrial sectors, on which local governments rely for tax revenue (for a discussion of ‘local development”
• Internal governance mechanisms and firm performance in China (2009, background): “For instance, Nee, Opper, and Wong (2007) show that direct state involvement not only fails to improve firms’ financial performance, but actually impacts negatively on various important firm decisions including personnel, strategic and financial decisions.”
• Retire in Peace: Officials’ Political Incentives and Corporate Diversification in China* (2018, background): “Described as a ‘‘party-state,’’ meaning ruled by a single party (Li and Zhou, 2005; Nee, Opper, and Wong, 2007; Lin, 2011), China’s state bureaucracy nevertheless has power dualism within its elite (Lieberthal, 1995).”
• Framing China: Transformation and Institutional Change through Co-evolution (2008, unknown): “Links between local businesses and local governments are well documented in the China literature on local state corporatism and state entrepreneurialism (Chen, 2007; Duckett, 1998; Gold, Guthrie, and Wank, 2002; Nee, Opper, and Wong, 2007; Oi, 1995), but these descriptive approaches generally do n”