The Taxation of Executive Compensation

By Brian J. Hall, Jeffrey B. Liebman. Tax Policy and the Economy, 2000

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/43f2b4d7837a19b1a5683bf7ac64fdcfd01fcc25

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Carola Frydman
2. Raven E. Saks
3. Kelly Shue
4. Yaniv Grinstein
5. Lisa A. Keister
6. Martijn Cremers

In Strategy and Management

1. Carola Frydman
2. Raven E. Saks
3. Kelly Shue
4. Lisa A. Keister
5. Yaniv Grinstein
6. Martijn Cremers

Citations in the corpus

• The Trouble with Stock Options (2003, unknown): “Research testing whether the new rule can explain the increase in option pay has been inconclusive (for example, Rose and Wolfram, 2002; Hall and Liebman, 2000; Perry and Zenner, 2001).”
• Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s (2001, unknown): “Hall and Liebman (2000), Perry and Zenner (2000), and Rose and Wolfram (2000) find that this legislation had at most a modest effect on the increased use of performance-based compensation.”
• Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees (2001, unknown): “We also control for the marginal tax rate as a potential determinant of option grants (Yermack, 1995; Matsunaga, 1995; Dechow et al., 1996; Hall and Liebman, 2000).”
• Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options (2010, unknown): “Marginal corporate tax rates may also affect the tendency to grant options (Yermack (1995), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996), Hall and Liebman (2000)).”
• Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s (2001, unknown): “The results in Hall and Liebman (1998, 2000) combined with those in Holderness , Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) suggest that managerial equity ownership is very high today relative to most of the last century (and perhaps all of it).”
• Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review (2003, unknown): “Nor do I distinguish between ISOs and NQOs, although Hall and Liebman (2000) note that NQOs account for 95% of option grants.”
• Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “…other possible factors include changes in the corporate governance of firms (Bebchuk and Fried 2004, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), tax advantages of certain instruments of pay (Hall and Liebman 2000), regulation (Rose and Wolfram 2000), and product market competition (Cuñat and Guadalupe 2006).”