Why do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations

By Mei Feng, Weili Ge, S. Luo, Terry Shevlin. 2011

628 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dd872d95001fcfa3cb6d7a0a00d3240f58b96e1d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Terry Shevlin
2. Christopher S. Armstrong
3. Qiang Cheng
4. David F. Larcker
5. Martin Walker
6. W. Guay
7. Jimmy Lee
8. Weili Ge

In Strategy and Management

1. Christopher S. Armstrong
2. Qiang Cheng
3. David F. Larcker
4. Terry Shevlin
5. Siqi Li
6. Lars Helge Haß
7. Martin Walker
8. Dain C. Donelson

Citations in the corpus

• Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, background): “However, this measure might also capture other constructs such as agency problems (Bebchuk et al. 2011; Feng et al. 2011): a lower ratio of subordinate executive pay to CEO pay implies entrenched CEOs.”
• Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting (2012, neutral): “Feng et al. (2011) similarly document no significant age differences across CFOs involved in frauds.”
• The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, neutral): “First, CEOs generally have the most influence setting the “tone at the top,” the effects of which cascade to other managers within the organization (e.g., Feng et al. 2011).”
• How do Auditors Respond to CEO Narcissism? Evidence from External Audit Fees (2015, background): “Furthermore, the findings in Feng et al. (2011) suggest that CEOs utilize their power to pressure CFOs to undertake accounting manipulations.”
• Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, methodology): “We investigate this alternative explanation by including two CEO power measures: CEO-chairman duality and founder status (Feng et al., 2011).”
• The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “44 Feng et al. (2009) also document that the penalties CFOs face can be quite severe: In roughly 20% of 496 AAER firms from 1982 to 2005, the CFO was charged with fraud while the CEO was not.”
• The impact of top executive gender on asset prices: Evidence from stock price crash risk (2019, positive): “Feng et al. (2011) document that CFOs may involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs.”