Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

By Ashwini Agrawal. 2012

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a177a847a36695652dfa3d1383ef8c5e2ae2e58d

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, unknown): “Agrawal (2012) also documents conflicts of interest in proxy voting.”
Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (2011, methodology): “Following Agrawal (2008), we focused on charges filed by labor unions against firms in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which stipulates that an employer cannot “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees” and on charges filed by f”
Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality (2017, background): “Agrawal (2012) and Ertimur et al. (2011) present evidence that AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) affiliated union pension funds are particularly activist in opposing management positions in shareholder proxy votes, especially around compensation.”
Common-Ownership Concentration and Corporate Conduct (2018, background): “…objectives and behavior are affected by ownership of company stock by a particular set of actors, such as activists (Brav et al. 2015), employees (Agrawal 2011), foreign sovereign wealth funds (Dewenter et al. 2010), “passive” investors, blockholders (Edmans 2014; Edmans & Holderness 2017), or…”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Second, her voting decisions may be conflicted: a labor union pension fund may vote for labor-friendly directors (Agrawal, 2012), or a mutual fund may side with underperforming management to preserve business ties (Davis and Kim, 2007).”
Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, unknown): “Walkling, 2011), and insignificant (Agrawal, 2012; Becht et al., 2010; Gillan & Starks, 2000).”
Employee Rights and Acquisitions (2015, unknown): “ Agrawal (2012) finds that votes by union-backed funds are associated with negative valuation effects (not observed for other institutional investors) and concludes that AFL-CIO 10 affiliated votes may seek to maximize worker interests and not necessarily shareholder value.”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “For example, a firm that was in the Russell 2000 index last year but was among the 1000 largest firms this year would only move to the Russell 1000 index if its market capitalization exceeded a certain threshold.”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, unknown): “Agrawal (2012) finds that pension funds affiliated with the AFL-CIO labor union become significantly less opposed to directors once the union no longer represents a firm's workers.”
Do Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect the Pricing of Risky Debt? Evidence from Unionized Workers (2012, unknown): “Fourth, in some companies, employees hold a non-negligible fraction of their companies’ shares, either directly or through their pension plans, and thus they can use their voting power to advance labor’s agenda (Faleye et al., 2006; Agrawal, 2008).”
The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model (2013, unknown): “Agrawal (2012) studies conflicts of interest in unions.”
Labor Unions and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “(Leung, Li and Rui, 2010; Agrawal, 2008).”