Mind and supermind

By Keith Frankish. 2004

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3bf811f77de165a391f9b89c386f3276d2e46fdf

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

The duality of mind: an historical perspective (2009, background): “Frankish (2004) argues that the folk-psychological term ‘belief’ is used to refer to two different types of state: one nonconscious, implicit, passive, graded, and nonlinguistic, the other conscious, explicit, active, binary, and language-involving.”
Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? (2008, background): “It is thinking of a shallower type (see Frankish, 2004).”
On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications for understanding individual differences in reasoning. (2012, background): “Th ere is a wide variety of evidence that has converged on the conclusion that some type of dual-process notion is needed in a diverse set of specialty areas not limited to cognitive psychology, social psychology, naturalistic philosophy, decision theory, and clinical psychology (Evans, 2003, 2008, ”
Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. (2008, background): “This might be taken to mean that folk psychological accounts of mind are adequate at the System 2 level provided the System 1 level of mind is also recognized (Frankish 2004).”
Communication as commitment sharing: speech acts, implicatures, common ground (2019, background): “To illustrate the implications of this sub- intentions have a normative aspect (see, e.g. Dennett 1987, Frankish 2004, Apperly 2011, Zawidzki 2013).”
The illusion of conscious will (2007, methodology): “Keywords Confabulation · Conscious thought · Conscious will · Dual systems · Self interpretation · Wegner”
Systems and levels: Dual-system theories and the personal- subpersonal distinction ∗ (2009, background): “A more plausible suggestion appeals to the role of metacognitive attitudes in subpersonal reasoning (Frankish 2004).”
Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look (2008, background): “For instance, many of those who study human reasoning think that the processes involved can be divided into two broad classes, often described as ‘System 1’ (whose components are ancient, swift, and shared with other species of animal) and ‘System 2’, which is slow, reflective, and distinctively hum”
A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes: Thinking Outside of the Belief Box (2013, background): “Broad-based dispositionalism thus encourages less pleasant but more salutary self-portraits: On the largest, most morally significant, life-permeating 14 On System 1 vs. System 2, see Frankish 2004; Evans 2008 – not that Frankish or Evans endorse the style of reasoning I criticize here.”