A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

By Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell. 2000

1,376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘‘regret-matching.’’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedure guarantees that, with probability one, the empirical distributions of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Economics & Operations Research

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Tuomas Sandholm
  2. Noam Brown
  3. Marc Lanctot
  4. Karl Tuyls
  5. Neil Burch
  6. Elad Hazan
  7. Julien Pérolat
  8. Aleksandrs Slivkins

In Management Science and Operations Research

  1. Karl Tuyls
  2. Marc Lanctot
  3. Aleksandrs Slivkins
  4. Elad Hazan
  5. Tuomas Sandholm
  6. David Silver
  7. Alekh Agarwal
  8. Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi

In Economics & Operations Research

  1. Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi
  2. Shai Shalev-Shwartz
  3. Josef Hofbauer
  4. Christos H. Papadimitriou
  5. Yishay Mansour
  6. Zhu Han
  7. Hongyuan Zha
  8. Sylvain Sorin

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