Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets

By Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Bernard Salanié. Journal of Political Economy, 2000

1,130 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c2909ad97941659e5fe3912b7b4768bd3ba54ea

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Testing Conditional Independence via Rosenblatt Transforms (2009, neutral): “E[βu(U){Z − p(U)}{γy(Ỹ )− y}] = 0 for all (y, u) ∈ [0, 1](2) (15)”
Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance (2017, neutral): “Previous literature often tests for private information by asking whether existing insurance contracts are adversely selected (Chiappori and Salanié (2000); Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)).”
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2010, positive): “Chiappori and Salanié (2000) also suggest a non-parametric test that is meant to overcome the relatively restrictive functional forms used in the two approaches presented above.”
Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data (2003, methodology): “The reader is referred to Rochet and Stole (2000) for a survey of multidimensional adverse selection, and to Chassagnon and Chiappori (2000), Jullien, Salanié, and Salanié (1999), and theory suggests that the characteristics of an optimal experience-rating scheme should be specific to each class…”
Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market (2002, background): “Chiappori and Salanie (2000) ®nd little evidence of adverse selection in the French auto insurance market, while Cutler and Reber (1998) report clear evidence of selection effects in the health insurance market.”
The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, neutral): “More recently, a growing empirical literature has developed ways to detect whether asymmetric information exists in particular insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006).”
Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the U.S. Auto Insurance Industry (2014, positive): “where η j and μ PI denote the parameters estimated based on the pricing regression shown in equation (14) and p ij denotes the residuals from the pricing regression shown in equation (13).”
Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment (2005, neutral): “See, e.g., Chiappori and Salanie (2000) on the analogous problem in insurance markets.”
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “This literature provides a nice example of the substantive importance of conditioning on the observable characteristics of the individual that determine the menu of contracts offered to him, as emphasized by Chiappori and Salanie (2000).”
Securitization is Not that Evil after All (2011, positive): “As pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) in the case of the insurance market the choice of whether to get full coverage or not could also be determined by totally different factors (say, preferences or risk aversion) that, by coincidence, turn out to be positively correlated with risk.”
Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market (2005, neutral): “Chiappori and Salanie (2000) suggest that the evidence is inconsistent with a coverage-accidents correlation in the market for automobile insurance.”