Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market

By Alma Cohen. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2005

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Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market (2006, unknown): “We then impute the mean and variance for each member j 2 IHRS of the HRS sample, as follows: Êj2 = ̂0 + ̂2Hj + ̂3Dj ; (14) d V ARj2 = ̂0 + ̂2Hj + ̂3Dj : (15)”
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2010, unknown): “Consistent with the possibility that customers with significant driving experience may have private information, Cohen (2005) found that customers with a bad record with the insurer that she studied were more likely to “flee their record” by switching to another insurer.14 Since at that time…”
Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap (2017, background): “12 For example, evidence from insurance markets both supports (Cohen 2005; Finkelstein and Poterba 2004) and undermines (Chiappori and Salanie 2000; Cardon and Hendel 2001) the hypothesis of asymmetric information.”
SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE: Separating Moral Hazard (2013, background): “More recently, Cohen (2005) has also found a positive correlation for less experienced policyholders in insurers pools from Israel.2 However, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) found no evidence of asymmetric information among French and Canadian insurers respectively.”