Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment

By Dean S. Karlan, Jonathan Zinman. 2005

569 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7b82c80701346cb42e7c852a43fc115edaacaaf5

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Performance and Outreach: A Global Analysis of Leading Microbanks (2006, background): “While we 4 New work using field experiments (Karlan and Zinman, 2005) or natural experiments (Dehejia et al., 2005) shows promise in ways either to exploit the variation that exists or to create variation as part of a research programme.”
The Long Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam (2006, unknown): “On the positive side, deposit-collection services may help to reduce information asymmetries, an important cause of friction in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Karlan and Zinman 2005 ), by providing lenders a low risk method of learning more about potential lending clients.”
Expanding credit access: Using randomized supply decisions to estimate the impacts (2006, unknown): “A prior experiment on experienced borrowers from the same lender found far greater sensitivity to maturity than price (Karlan and Zinman 2006a); as Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kryiazidou (2004) show formally, this pattern of elasticities is further evidence of unmet demand for credit.”
Access to Finance (2010, unknown): “Working with a consumer-credit lender in South Africa, Karlan and Zinman (2009b; 2009a) show that there is room for improvement in the screening process.”
Rank And Response: A Field Experiment On Peer Information And Water Use Behavior (2017, background): “Furthermore, studies that do use multiple mailers in other contexts tend not to address the e ect of additional mailers (Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Bertrand et al., 2010).”
Eliciting and Utilizing Willingness to Pay: Evidence from Field Trials in Northern Ghana (2020, unknown): “Karlan and Zinman (2009) and Ashraf et al. (2010), among others, use a secondstage randomized discount to identify the causal effect of price paid.”
USING RANDOMIZATION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH: A TOOLKIT (2008, background): “, 2006), or moral hazard and adverse selection in consumer credit markets (Karlan and Zinman, 2005b), have attempted to answer important policy questions and have also been used by economists as a testing ground for their theories.”
The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information (2010, background): “Karlan and Zinman (2010) use a two-stage experiment in which borrowers are first offered randomized interest rates in order to measure adverse selection effects, and then among those who come for loans the rate is further randomized downward by surprise in order to isolate moral hazard.”
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, unknown): “…quasi-experimental variation in prices that consumers face to try to separate selection from moral hazard (see e.g., Abbring, Chiappori, & Pinquet, 2003a; Abbring, Heckman, Chiappori, & Pinquet, 2003b; Adams, Einav, & Levin, 2009; Cutler & Reber, 1998; Einav et al. (2010a); Karlan & Zinman, 2009).”