Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data
By J. Abbring, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, J. Pinquet. 2003
221 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0ff981c8a94da443b037954fd5edfe68689a89b8
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Citations in the corpus
- The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, unknown): “…or when employers change the menu of health insurance plans from which their employees can choose.24 Non-linear experience rating schemes may also introduce useful variation in the incentive e¤ects of insurance policies (Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet, 2003a; Abbring et al., 2003b; Israel, 2004).”
- Quantifying Search and Switching Costs in the U.S. Auto Insurance Industry (2014, unknown): “Puelz and Snow (1994) and Dionne et al. (2001) tested for the existence of adverse selection; Cummins and Tennyson (1996), Abbring et al. (2003), and Israel (2007) studied whether evidence for moral hazard in the auto insurance industry can be found.”
- Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data (2011, methodology): “Recently, a handful of papers separately test for moral hazard in longitudinal auto insurance data using a dynamic approach pioneered by Japp H. Abbring, Chiappori, and Jean Pinquet (2003) and Abbring et al. (2003).”
- SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE: Separating Moral Hazard (2013, unknown): “Abbring et al. (2003) look into this possibility and, using the claims duration data, find that this may matter with higher frequency data.”
- Semiparametric Estimation of a Panel Data Proportional Hazards Model with Fixed Effects (2004, background): “8 The censoring mechanism here governs the sum of T1 and T2, rather than each 8This assumption seems reasonable for pure renewal processes, for example, car insurance claim durations analyzed in Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet (2003). separately.”