Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
By Alma Cohen, Peter Siegelman. 2010
441 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/541ba5b7e73512a1625adcc7013cbaeb09ec526c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Raj Chetty
- L. Risse
- L. Farrell
- T. Fry
- Dmitry Taubinsky
- Nathaniel Hendren
- Alex Rees-Jones
Citations in the corpus
- The significance of financial self-efficacy in explaining women’s personal finance behaviour (2016, background): “An individual’s assessment of their own health status, outside of the scope our model, is also likely to be a strong predictor (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010; Doiron, Jones, & Savage, 2008).”
- SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE: Separating Moral Hazard (2013, neutral): “On the effectiveness of experience rating, see Dionne and Doherty (1994) and de Garidel-Thoron (2005). 5 Their estimate of negative occurrence dependence among inexperienced drivers is insignificant. Further, combining claims at-fault and other claims changes the result significantly, as would be pr”
- Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “Cohen and Siegelman (2010) provide a comprehensive review of this work.”