The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
By Liran Einav, Amy N. Finkelstein, Paul Schrimpf. 2007
165 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b21cfbee4f7f68458c0e99e910294dd9b856f6e2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Raj Chetty
- Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
- Motohiro Yogo
- Daniel Gottlieb
- Eduardo M. Azevedo
- Ralph S. J. Koijen
- Dmitry Taubinsky
In Economics and Econometrics
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Raj Chetty
- Ralph S. J. Koijen
- Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
- Motohiro Yogo
- Daniel Gottlieb
- Eduardo M. Azevedo
- Dmitry Taubinsky
In General Health Professions
Citations in the corpus
- Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, methodology): “…to the constrained efficient allocation which is the one that maximizes social welfare subject to the constraint that price is the only instrument available for screening (see Einav et al., 2010a for further discussion). heterogeneity is essential for generating these upward sloping cost curves.”
- Health and Mortality Delta: Assessing the Welfare Cost of Household Insurance Choice (2016, background): “We refer the reader to a related literature that studies the welfare implications of pooled pricing and private information in annuity (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010)) and health insurance markets (Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010), Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney (2012)).”
- Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “As Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010) have shown, mandates may decrease welfare.”