Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock-Option Grants

By Keith W. Chauvin, C. Shenoy. 2001

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2ad051ea98362da6b85db896798d9b1707e459fd

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Citations in the corpus

Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Subsequent research suggests that rms actively manipulate the disclosure of information around CEO option awards, delaying the release of good news and accelerating the disclosure of bad news (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001).”
On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards (2005, unknown): “If so, it could explain why Yermack (1997) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find weaker stock return patterns using earlier samples than this study.”
Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options (2009, unknown): “Subsequent studies, including Chauvin and Shenoy (2001), Lie (2005), Collins et al. (2005a and 2005b), Heron and Lie (2006a), and Narayanan and Seyhun (2006), find significantly negative abnormal returns before option grants and positive abnormal returns after the grants.”
Option Backdating and Board Interlocks (2009, unknown): “In contrast, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find some evidence of stock price decreases prior to stock option grants and suggest managers release poor news just prior to a grant in order to lower the”
Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “They also find that stock returns are systematically lower prior to grant dates and increase afterwards (Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Yermack, 1997).”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Using a different data source, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) 1026 Journal of Management / December 2007 found negative abnormal returns prior to CEO stock option grants; however, they found no evidence of positive abnormal returns after awards.”
Value creation from M&As: New evidence (2017, unknown): “( see Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001).”
Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? the Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors (2007, unknown): “Other important actions include fortuitous timing of option grants (Yermack, 1997), timing the release of information to disclose bad news prior to option issuance or good news afterward (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001), and back-dating (or forward-dating) of options to minimize ”
Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “…of BD-related issues took several years and resulted in substantial 6 A number of studies had already documented a systematically favorable stock price pattern around executive option grants (Yermack, 1997; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001; Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam, 2004).”