Option Backdating and Board Interlocks

By John M. Bizjak, Mike Lemmon, Ryan J. Whitby. 2009

442 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/36350a5f3588dacf3290f2667f7150406b48f787

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Yonca Ertimur
2. F. Ferri
3. David A. Maber
4. Ye Cai
5. Merih Sevilir
6. Siew Hong Teoh
7. Donald Palmer
8. Feng Tian

In Finance

1. David A. Maber
2. Merih Sevilir
3. Siew Hong Teoh
4. Ye Cai
5. Donald Palmer
6. Feng Tian
7. F. Ferri
8. Yonca Ertimur

Citations in the corpus

• Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors (2009, unknown): “In particular, in a contemporaneous study that complements our work, Bizjak et al. (2009) show a link between the spread of option backdating and interlocking directors.”
• Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion (2013, result): “The evidence on the higher frequency of stock option backdating in board interlocked firms mentioned earlier (Bizjak et al. 2009) is also consistent with this effect.”
• Boardroom Centrality and Firm Performance (2013, unknown): “For example, the boardroom network has been found as an important explanation for the spread of options backdating (Bizjak et al., 2009; Snyder et al., 2009; Armstrong and Larcker, 2009).”
• Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management (2015, unknown): “Alternately, it is possible that peer firms learn about earnings management through shared auditors and board members (see Francis and Michas [2013], Bizjak et al. [2009] and Chiu et al. [2013]).”
• Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, methodology): “, 2009), when option-based pay for directors is higher (Byard and Li, 2005; Minnick and Zhao, 2009), and when directors and CEOs receive options around the same time (Bizjak et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010).”
• Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance (2020, unknown): “7 See, for example, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013), and Fracassi (2016).”
• Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options (2009, unknown): “Recently, the Corporate Library, an independent research firm that provides data and analysis of corporate governance issues, has claimed that interlocking boards may be responsible for spreading the backdating practice across firms (see also Bizjak et al., 2006).”
• Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy (2014, unknown): “A growing body of research (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2008; Bizjak et al. 2009; Stuart and Yim 2010; Brown 2011; Cai and Sevilir 2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 2012) examines the role of board networks in corporate financial policy.”
• Shared Auditors in Mergers and Acquisitions (2016, unknown): “6 See, for example, Agrawal, et al. (2012), Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009), Cai and Sevilir (2012), and Stuart and Yim (2010). service, involvement and advice to their clients’ in the deal process.”
• Organizations Gone Wild: The Causes, Processes, and Consequences of Organizational Misconduct (2010, background): “Finally, the best evidence of misconduct spreading through imitation was the spread of option backdating through the board interlock network (Bizjak et al., 2009).”
• Board Connections and M&A Transactions (2012, background): “…and Lindsey (2008) in strategic alliances, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003) in lending markets, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) and Kuhnen (2009) on the effect of social ties in the mutual fund industry, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) on how board links play a role in spreading the option…”