Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa

By Stephen A. Block. 2002

330 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, background): “For multi-country studies, see Ames (1987); Kraemer (1997); Rojas-Suarez et al. (1998) for difierent samples of Latin American countries, Alesina et al. (1997); Franzese (2000); Tujula & Wolswijk (2004) for difierent samples of OECD countries, Schuknecht (1996) for a panel of 35 developing countries”
The role of country-level institutional factors in escaping the natural resource curse: Insights from Ghana (2019, background): “Prior research suggests that any development-oriented initiative that does not include and drive democratic policies to bring sustainable change, might fail to achieve political stability, growth and development (Aslaksen, 2010; Barro, 1999; Block, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Lehman and Thorne”
The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries (2004, background): “While it is difficult to generalize across the range of developing countries, recent studies of such countries have favored the opportunistic branch (Schuknecht, 1996; Svennson and Shi, 2003; Block, 2002).”
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? (2006, methodology): “Studies using data from developing countries include Block (2002), Gonzalez (2002b), Magloire (1997), Khemani (2000), Kraemer (1997), Schuknecht (1996).”
Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems (2003, background): “Schucknecht (1996) and Block (2000) study different samples of developing countries, so does Gonzalez (1999) who also focuses on the interaction with the quality of democratic institutions.”
Fiscal Capacity and the Quality of Government in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013, background): “Similarly, Block (2002) shows that governments in Africa use fiscal policy strategically to affect election outcomes.”
Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, background): “Consistent with the findings of Keech and Pak, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) find evidence of a 5 See also Block (2002) for a recent cross-section study.”
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, neutral): “4Other works on a cross-section of countries are Ames (1987) that shows the presence of budget cycles in 17 Latin American countries, Block (2002) finding evidence of political budget cycles in both monetary and fiscal policy in 44 sub-Saharan countries and Schuknecht (1996) that focuses on 35…”
The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, methodology): “Block (2002) uses annual data on 44 Sub-Saharan 38 Drazen and Eslava (2006) design a model of political business cycles which is consistent with this recent empirical evidence.”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2005, background): “5 Cross-country evidence indicates that electoral cycles in monetary and fiscal policy are significantly larger in developing economies (Block 2002; Schuknecht 2000; Shi and Svensson 2000).”
Counting the investor vote: political business cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries (2005, neutral): “Block (2002) also finds evidence of opportunistic behavior in the fiscal and monetary policies in a sample of African countries covering the 1980s and 1990s.”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “Block et al. (2003) hypothesize that initial or founding multiparty elections would present both the greatest incentives for and the fewest constraints on electoral economic manipulation.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, positive): “Brender and Drazen (2005) even argue that until recently a PBC was generally thought to be a phenomenon of less developed economies.”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2003, positive): “electoral cycles in monetary and fiscal policy are significantly larger in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2002; Block, 2002; Schuknecht, 2000).”
Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle? (2006, background): “Block (2002) studies a cross-section of 44 sub-Saharan African countries, and finds electoral cycles in both expenditures and budget deficits.”