The price of democracy: sovereign risk ratings, bond spreads and political business cycles in developing countries

By Stephen A. Block, Paul M. Vaaler. 2004

262 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe4febb0324ee44cd673b95647d3bb11dca940c2

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Citations in the corpus

ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “Paldam (1979, 1981), Golden & Poterba (1980), MacRae (1981), Haynes & Stone (1988, 1989, 1990, 1994), Willett (1988), Grier (1989), Klein (1996), and Schuknecht (1996) all find some signs of outcome cycles, Haynes & Stone most favorably and stridently.”
Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, background): “Schuknecht (1996) is a comprehensive study of the political business cycle in 35 less-developed countries over the period 1970-92.5 He argues that there is more room for manipulation in LDCs, as checks and balances are weaker and the incumbent has more power over monetary and fiscal policy.”
The impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns: the case of Canada (2005, background): “(1) the probability of default of a country, (2) the risk ratings and the credit spreads of sovereign borrowers, and (3) capital flight (Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987; Ketkar and Ketkar, 1989; Block et al., 2003; Block and Vaaler, 2004; Vaaler et al., 2005).”
Escaping the iron cage: Liabilities of origin and CSR reporting of emerging market multinational enterprises (2017, background): “These companies pursue such listings to improve their access to capital as well as their brand exposure in those markets (Block & Vaaler, 2004; Siegel, 2005; UNCTAD, 2011).”
Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies (2008, background): “As in group (i), I consider a world with equilibrium default where countries cannot borrow or save in the default period.(8) Similar to Cuadra and Sapriza (2008) and Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2009) this paper incorporates political uncertainty into a model of sovereign debt.”
Political Rights and the Cost of Debt (2010, unknown): “Additionally, Block and Vaaler (2004) and Vaaler, Schrage, and Block (2005, 2006) find that the political business cycle affects the bond rating and bond yield of sovereign bonds.”
PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies (2011, unknown): “Finally, taking into account the ordinal nature of sovereign debt ratings we follow the approach of Hu et al. (2002) or Block and Vaaler (2004 ) b y performing an ordered logit regression (see Column 4 in Table 2). Again, the PIGS× Crisis interaction term is negative and significant at a 99 percent”
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, unknown): “…(1987) that shows the presence of budget cycles in 17 Latin American countries, Block (2002) finding evidence of political budget cycles in both monetary and fiscal policy in 44 sub-Saharan countries and Schuknecht (1996) that focuses on 35 developing countries over the years between 1970 and 1992.”
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law (2012, methodology): “…Stasavage 2002, who notes the importance not necessarily of veto players but of cross-issue coalitions that help promote debt repayment under limited government+ 62+ See Block and Vaaler 2004; Vaaler and McNamara 2004; and Vaaler, Schrage, and Block 2005+ 63+ See Johnson and Crisp 2003, who argue…”
Counting the investor vote: political business cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries (2005, unknown): “Recent reviews of the PBC research by Drazen (2000), Franzese (2002) and Block and Vaaler (2004) chronicle a growing empirical literature, but with more growth in the opportunistic rather than partisan PBC branches, and with much more work in both branches in industrialized country rather than…”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “For instance, Schuknecht (1996) reports a PBC in his sample of 35 developing countries over the 1975–92 period.”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…(1991) in international relations, Shughart and Tollison (1985), Lagona and Padovano (2008) and Brechler and Geršl (2014) in legislative activity, Block and Vaaler (2004) in ratings published by agencies, Thies and Porche (2007) in agricultural producer protection, Ladewig (2008) in the housing…”
Crisis and Competition in Expert Organizational Decision Making: Credit-Rating Agencies and Their Response to Turbulence in Emerging Economies (2004, background): “…and emerging-market countries in a single year (Cantor and Packer 1996, Larraín et al. 1997, Afonso 2003) and for emerging-market countries over several years (McNamara and Vaaler 2000, Block and Vaaler 2004) are largely explained with as few as seven macroeconomic and related sovereign factors.”
Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World? (2007, methodology): “…study horizon+ A second consideration is serial correlation of the errors within panels+ Wooldridge 55+ World Bank 2004+ See Vaaler and Schrage 2004; Block and Vaaler 2004; and Vaaler, Schrage, and Block 2006, who also use World Development Indicators for economic measures+ 56+ See Cantor and…”