Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?

By Min Shi, Jakob Svensson. 2006

956 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f8a915378af0852b9f7a5f47fbea63ce3ff8d8c

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries (2010, background): “For theoretical enhancements and empirical evaluations see, for example, Shi and Svensson (2006) or Angelopoulos and Economides (2008).”
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, positive): “This applies both for papers studying aggregate fiscal variables (see, e.g., Brender and Drazen 2005; Shi and Svensson 2006) as well as papers looking at the composition of fiscal spending (see, e.g., Schuknecht 2000; Block 2002; Bräuninger 2005; Vergne 2009).14 Our fiscal data are from the IMF,…”
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model (2011, background): “…with the size of the rent that politicians can earn by remaining in o¢ ce and with the share of uninformed voters in the electorate (Shi and Svensson, 2006); that opportunistic scal manipulations are more pronounced in "new" than in "established" democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005) but…”
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India (2008, background): “Shi and Svensson (2006) present a model in which the share of informed voters a¤ects the size of the observed election cycles: since informed voters are not fooled by manipulation, the greater the share of informed voters, the smaller the incentive to manipulate.”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, background): “Shi and Svensson (2006) claim that the size of the electoral budget cycles depends positively on politicians’ rents of remaining in power and, negatively, on the share of informed voters in the electorate.”
How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries (2008, background): “6 Shi and Svensson (2006) find that, in an election year, the government surplus falls significantly in less”
Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects (2011, methodology): “The nature of the endogeneity problem when estimating potential election effects is discussed in Shi and Svensson (2006).”
Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns (2017, background): “Thus, electoral cycles are more likely in developing countries ( Shi and Svensson, 2006 ) or in “young democracies” ( Brender and Drazen, 2005 ), due to lower access to free media or lack of familiarity with electoral politics.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, positive): “…that the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes depend on factors, such as the level of development (Shi and Svensson 2006), institutional quality (Shi and Svensson 2006), age of democracy (Brender and Drazen 2005), level of democracy (Gonzales…”
The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, background): “Shi and Svensson (2006) assemble a panel data of 85 countries for the period 1975-95 and they nd that on average government de cit as a share of GDP increases by almost one percentage point in election years; these budget cycles, though, seem to be statistically signi cant only in developing…”
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, methodology): “Through a similar procedure, Shi & Svensson (2006) found robust evidence of fiscal deficit increases in election years, an effect that is much larger in developing countries than in developed ones.”