Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies

By Adi Brender, Allan Drazen. 2005

1,005 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a34f64196bff3f0dadb4183d858f3f5aa92c4ef3

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India (2017, background): “…of regulatory services delivered to firms.10 Past research has highlighted the role of democracy in improving the allocation of government inputs (Brender and Drazen 2005; Burgess et al. 2015); this paper provides evidence that electoral politics brings its own distortions, which can be…”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “…diversified theories 3See, inter alia, Peltzman (1992); Alesina et al. (1998); Brender (2003); Buti and van der Noord (2003); Von Hagen (2003); Andrikopoulos et al. (2004); Brender and Drazen (2005); Drazen and Eslava (2005); Mink and de Haan (2005); Alt and Lassen (2006a, 2006b); Schneider (2007).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “(2012), Enkelmann and Leibrecht (2013), Brender and Drazen (2013). Most of these studies conclude in favor of PBCs in most visible components.”
Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects (2011, methodology): “A similar approach to solve the endogeneity problem was adopted by Shi and Svensson (2006) and Brender and Drazen (2004). They conducted separate estimations for countries where the elections were held within six months before or after the scheduled election date, which they argue can be considered ”
The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments (2011, neutral): “However, Brender and Drazen (2005) show, in fact, that while political budget cycles are common in new democracies (like in Central and Eastern Europe) they are not the norm in established ones, where increases in defi cits tend to reduce the electoral success for the incumbents.”
Political budget cycles in Indonesia at the district level (2013, background): “The bulk of empirical evidence supports the notion that political budget cycles (PBCs)may be found in young democracies, while there is much less evidence that voters in established democracies reward pre-election increases in spending (Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006”
Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, neutral): “Unlike in Brender and Drazen (2005), the ‘political cycle’ – a larger deficit in the election year – does not appear to be significant for the countries in our sample.”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, background): “Brender and Drazen (2005) suggest that the results of these studies are driven by the first elections in countries that are “new democracies”.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, neutral): “These findings are only partly in line with the results of Brender and Drazen (2005), who found no significant PBC effect in mature democracies.”