Counting the investor vote: political business cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries

By Paul M. Vaaler, Burkhard Schrage, Stephen A. Block. 2005

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eff78a4cd5a66aa80836256bca1dea3299cbb5f4

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Citations in the corpus

Political risk and dividend policy: Evidence from international political crises (2015, unknown): “Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2014) and Vaaler, Schrage, and Block (2005) document that political risk is a strong predictor of sovereign debt spreads.”
Understanding corruption and firm responses in cross-national firm-level surveys (2010, methodology): “Early research on the multinational firm, such as Vernon (1971, 1977) and Wells (1977), identified corruption as a potential cost of doing business that was heightened by the obsolescing bargain.”
Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law (2012, background): “…and Weingast 1996, 1998, and 2003+ 28+ See Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007; Saiegh 2005; and Tomz 2007+ 29+ See Block and Vaaler 2004; Vaaler and McNamara 2004; and Vaaler, Schrage, and Block 2005+ See Archer, Biglaiser, and DeRouen 2007 for determinants commonly tested in the political…”
Sovereign Bonds and the “Democratic Advantage”: Does Regime Type Affect Credit Rating Agency Ratings in the Developing World? (2007, background): “The importance of bond financing for developing countries is evident if one examines the amount of finance developing countries receive through the bond markets+ Over the past decade there has been an explosion in bonds purchased by foreign investors in the developing world+ As Figure 1 demonstrates”
Political risk spreads (2014, unknown): “Vaaler, Schrage, and Block (2005) show that spreads increase when the probability that a right-wing government is replaced by a left-wing government.”