Organizational Complexity and Succession Planning

By L. Naveen. 2006

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/28aaab0e97b7e39be3717ef1e559fd3c50b31406

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Ryan Williams
2. Omesh Kini
3. Michael S. Weisbach
4. Anand Venkateswaran
5. Ebru Reis
6. R. Duchin
7. D. Sosyura
8. Jayant R. Kale

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

1. Omesh Kini
2. Ebru Reis
3. Ryan Williams
4. Anand Venkateswaran
5. Jayant R. Kale
6. Yuhai Xuan

Citations in the corpus

• Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, unknown): “The signs of the coefficients on the remaining control variables generally are similar to those documented in prior literature (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)).”
• Rank-Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance (2009, methodology): “…is two.15 We follow Parrino (1997) to construct the variable Industry Homogeneity, which measures the similarity 13 This is a modified version of the variable in Naveen (2006), who does not impose any restriction on the difference in compensation between the highest and the next highest paid VP.”
• Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2012, background): “Finally, managers can increase firm risk through more aggressive debt policy (see, e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006).”
• One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “For example, firms typically have managerial succession processes in place (e.g. Vancil 1987; Naveen 2006).”
• Empire-Building or Bridge-Building? Evidence from New CEOs' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions (2009, background): “First, numerous studies show that the COO or the President is the most likely person to become the next CEO (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Naveen 2006), and individuals in an organization derive power from formal positions and authority (Finkelstein 1992).”
• Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation (2013, background): “Some firms identify a replacement CEO several years before a leadership change takes place (see Naveen (2006)).”