Empire-Building or Bridge-Building? Evidence from New CEOs' Internal Capital Allocation Decisions

By Yuhai Xuan. 2009

178 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a6e68ed2ca4cf99d88996e501071d0e56e4c8c5a

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Citations in the corpus

Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay (2013, background): “Xuan (2009) finds that appointment of specialist CEOs in multi-division firms leads to inefficient capital allocation decisions.”
Can Strong Boards and Trading Their Own Firm’s Stock Help CEOs Make Better Decisions? Evidence from Acquisitions by Overconfident CEOs (2013, background): “Hence, we demonstrate that firm investment policy can be impacted by a manager’s recent experience, in addition to the formative educational and early career experience studied in prior literature (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Graham and Narasimhan (2004), and Xuan (2009)).”
Why Do Firms Use High Discount Rates (2016, background): “Together, these features of multisegment firms can create an incentive to report optimistic cash flow forecasts (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Stein, 2002; McNeil and Smythe, 2009; and Xuan, 2009).”
Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, background): “Thus, it is possible that the weak result related to CEO 18 Xuan (2009) documents “reverse favoritism” in which new CEOs allocate relatively more capital to divisions other than the one(s) in which they previously worked.”
The dark side of CEO ability: CEO general managerial skills and cost of equity capital☆ (2014, unknown): “General managerial skills (as opposed to specialist managerial skills) may be an optimal choice for conglomerate firms (Xuan, 2009).”
Evidence on the Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets (2010, background): “Manager promotion and rotation policies across divisions may be one way to mitigate divisional incentives for overinvestment (Xuan, 2006), as would more high-powered incentives for divisional managers (Palia and Ye, 2003).”