Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance

By R. Romano. 2002

204 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/27fbfa25a89829f24771751fb8efcad4b0be1884

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (2011, background): “Studies from the 1980s and 1990s conclude that shareholder proposals are ineffective in eliciting change and improving performance at target firms (Black 1998; Karpoff 2001; Romano 2001; Gillan and Starks 2007).”
The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing (2009, background): “The empirical evidence from the 1980s and 1990s generally indicates a weak impact of shareholder proposals on the governance practices of targeted firms (Black 1998; Gillan and Starks 1998, 2007; Karpoff 2001; Romano 2001).”
The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice (2007, unknown): “…on the subject, Black (1990); Grundfest (1993); Romano (1993); Black and Coffee (1994); Roe (1994); Macey (1997); Gillan and Starks (1998); Romano (2001); Palmiter (2002); Bainbridge (2005); and Bebchuk (2005) discuss how shareholder activism has been practiced, describe some of the…”
Investor Activism and Takeovers (2009, background): “In addition, from their study of all blockholders of U.S. public companies between 1980 and 2005, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2006) find that large shareholders exert measurable effects on firms’ investment and financial policies, as well as executive compensation.”
Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation (2010, unknown): “Moreover, many recent corporate scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, stock option backdating, etc.) provide institutional owners incentives to promote broad governance reform to prevent future corporate wrongdoings (Romano, 2001).”
INVESTOR ACTIVISM, MANAGERIAL RESPONSIVENESS, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (2007, unknown): “Romano (2001) suggests that leaders of activist public pension funds may use the publicity surrounding activism to their political advantage by garnering votes and improving their future career prospects.”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, unknown): “53 As Romano (2001) has argued and as the empirical evidence to date suggests [see Karpoff (1998)], USA institutional activism can be ineffective or misplaced.”
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance (2008, background): “James River Coal’s stock price rose more than 10% to $39.77 on that day.”
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (2014, background): “Several survey articles have shown that shareholders’ main tool, shareholder proposals, is weak and ineffective in eliciting change in the targeted firm (e.g., Black, 1998; Karpoff, 2001; Romano, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2007).”