Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

By Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, Randall S. Thomas. 2008

1,424 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa32ac55fdf38a29f702fdb6a754717c50d3fe63

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Citations in the corpus

Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “Although Brav et al. (2008) report that hedge funds tend to target more liquid firms, they do not consider how liquidity impacts their incentive to undertake activism.”
Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, positive): “In the United States, hedge funds tend to target more profitable firms than other activists, seldom seek control, tend to be non-confrontational and mostly address cash-flow agency costs (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009).”
The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, methodology): “Brav et al. (2008) investigate whether hedge fund activists simply identify undervalued targets without adding to firms’ fundamental values.”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, background): “11 strengthen the link between executive pay and performance (Brav et al., 2008).”
Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be Engaged (2018, background): “(Similarly, Brav et al. 2008 report average announcement returns of 7–8% around 13D filings.)”
Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy (2014, neutral): “Brav et al. (2008) estimate that the activist share of total institutional equity ownership ranges from 0.”
Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, neutral): “The characteristics of target firms mentioned above (i.e., they have low valuations, growth rates, and payout ratios) are consistent across different studies.”
Did Structured Credit Fuel the LBO Boom (2011, positive): “Recent work such as Brav et al. (2008) documents the emergence of activist hedge funds that sought to correct some of these agency conflicts. Financial sponsors raised record levels of capital and employed transaction structures such as club deals (Boone and Mulherin (2009), Officer, Ozbas, and Sens”