Investor Activism and Takeovers

By Robin Greenwood, Michael Schor. 2009

453 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c131f3af5b337f32eeb4776e22aa46e09abf1fe7

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional investors as monitors of corporate diversification decisions: Evidence from real estate investment trusts (2014, unknown): “5 The incentive for large investors to monitor has been discussed by many – see Huddart (1993) or Shleifer and Vishny (1986), for example.”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “Heflin and Shaw (2000) document a negative correlation between block ownership and stock liquidity. This is consistent with liquidity hindering blockholder activism, although it could also suggest that block ownership reduces liquidity. In contrast, Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2009) find a pos”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Greenwood & Schor (2009) find that most returns from hedge fund activism result from eventual takeovers of a minority of targeted companies.”
Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value (2012, background): “5 See, for example, Brav, Jiang, Portnoy, and Thomas (2007), Klein and Zur (2007), Clifford (2007), Greenwood and Schor (2009), Gillan and Starks (2007) and Brav, Jiang, and Kim (2009).”
Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, unknown): “Hedge fund activism also results in large positive abnormal returns for target firms around takeover announcements, with hostile activism typically receiving a more favourable market reaction (Greenwood and Schor, 2009).”
The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, methodology): “Greenwood and Schor (2009), on the other hand, attribute positive returns of target firms to hedge funds’ ability to force target firms into a takeover.6 Building upon this literature, we argue that hedge fund activists have the incentive and the ability to influence their target firms’ tax…”
Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional Investors and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (2010, unknown): “(Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2008) and, more recently, hedge funds (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008; Greenwood and Schor, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009) have been pioneers in shareholder activism, using the proxy process and other approaches to pressure corporate managers for change.”
Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “Our data is more similar to that of Greenwood and Schor (2009) who collect both 13D and DFAN filings from a period similar to ours (1993–2006).”
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, unknown): “This evidence qualifies the results by Greenwood and Schor (2009) who provide evidence that a large proportion of”