The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice

By Anat R. Admati, P. Pfleiderer. 2007

810 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e96c980fb37fff19ecc758937db05069d99744e5

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Citations in the corpus

Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2015, background): “However, recent theoretical models show that activism through ‘exit’ can also be effective and perhaps more beneficial (e.g., Attari, Banerjee and Noe, 2006; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2008; Gopalan, 2008; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2009).”
The Empirical Analysis of Liquidity (2014, background): “Moreover, the authors provide evidence consistent with the predictions of Admati and Pfleiderer [2009] that governance via exit should be more effective in overcoming the “bad” agency problem — the results are stronger for cash rich firms in which the agency problems between shareholders and manager”
Can Sustainable Investing Save the World? Reviewing the Mechanisms of Investor Impact (2020, neutral): “Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), and Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim (2017)).”
The Real Effects of Short-Selling Constraints (2014, neutral): “Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) argue that the threat by large shareholders of selling shares may be”
Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active Owners (2016, positive): “But Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) show how exit can be a form a voice and have disciplinary effects on corporatemanagement, especially when pay is tied to the share price. Active ownership, in particular along path (b), involves loyalty, which is positioned centrally in the model and with a permeable”
Voting with Their Feet or Activism? Institutional Investors’ Impact on CEO Turnover (2012, positive): “Recent theoretical work suggests that when institutions choose to exit underperforming stocks, the sale of shares may serve as a governance mechanism (Edmans (2009), Edmans and Manso (2011), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)).”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “Second, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011) show that the act of selling one’s shares (engaging in “exit”), far from being the antithesis of governance, can be a governance mechanism in itself. Such sales drive down the stock price, hurting the manager ex post if”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, neutral): “In Edmans (2009) and Edmans & Manso (2011), the blockholder has full discretion regarding when to sell, but in Admati & Pfleiderer (2009), she may suffer a liquidity shock that forces her to sell regardless of the manager's action.”
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production (2015, positive): “Upon processing that information, they can either trade on that information or exert pressure on management to make changes to firm policies (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011).”
Stock Market Liquidity and Firm Value (2009, neutral): “…28 August 2008 Available online 21 June 2009 JEL classification: G12 G14 G34 Keywords: Stock market liquidity Firm performance Feedback mechanism Managerial compensation Blockholder intervention a b s t r a c t This paper investigates the relation between stock liquidity and firm performance.”