Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy

By S. Gordon, C. Hafer. American Political Science Review, 2005

202 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature (2005, background): “Gordon and Hafer (2005) build a model predicting that large contributors are less likely to comply with regulations than smaller ones.”
Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality (2009, unknown): “9 In similar spirit, Gordon and Hafer (2005) propose that a governmental agency has incomplete information regarding the firm’s objective function and, in particular, its costs from complying with the regulation.”
Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications (2005, background): “More recently Gordon and Hafer (2005) develop a model in which the influence of regulators is indirect.”
Corporate Lobbying Revisited (2008, methodology): “Numerous studies find political favors in terms of, for example, trade barriers (Goldberg and Maggi 1999), academic earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006), regulatory inspections (Gordon and Hafer 2005), and rate-of-return regulation (Bonardi et al. 2006).”
Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents (2006, methodology): “This type of selection argument is formalized in Ashworth (2005) and Zaller (1998), and is shown to be an empirically important part of the incumbency advantage in Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and Moro (2003).”