Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents

By Scott Ashworth. American Political Science Review, 2006

136 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/574f69977f5673c94f6f365b608ec3729dc6446e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. G. Edwards
2. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo
3. Thomas Stratmann

In Political Science and International Relations

1. G. Edwards
2. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo
3. Thomas Stratmann

In Strategy and Management

1. G. Edwards
2. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo
3. Thomas Stratmann

Citations in the corpus

• Individual Political Contributions and Firm Performance (2012, unknown): “The prospect that politicians exchange favors for votes is also present in Prat (2002), Coate (2004), and Ashworth (2006). Figure 1 hints that individuals are in fact strategic and contribute in times when their economic”
• Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory Outcomes in Telecommunications (2005, background): “To the extent that we provide evidence that campaign contributions do affect policymaking, our work directly informs the recent work by Coate (2004) and Ashworth (2006) who provide theoretical models showing that there are potentially Pareto-improving rationales for limits on contributions.”
• Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature (2005, background): “When a candidate’s position is flexible, interest groups may contribute because they want to move the officeseekers’s platform closer to their own position (Coate, 2004a; Ashworth, 2003; Prat, 2002a).”