Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: the impact of a bid on directors' wealth and board seats

By Jarrad Harford. 2003

285 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/24ceaa3d1e8044da1731727c70481f011d6b3261

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Citations in the corpus

Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis (2008, background): “On the one hand, studies by Coles and Hoi (2003), Gilson (1990), Harford (2003), and Kaplan and Reishus (1990) indicate that the number of boards on which a director sits is positively related to the performance of the firms on which he sits.”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, methodology): “We follow Harford (2003) in measuring target CEO retention using the first proxy statement following the takeover.”
Managerial Incentives, Capital Reallocation, and the Business Cycle (2008, background): “Harford (2003), in an interesting study of target directors’ incentives, finds that the financial impact on outside directors of a completed merger is predominantly negative.”
Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards (2005, unknown): “…it is difficult for outsiders to generate information when firm insiders have an incentive to conceal it (given the ex ante 3See Gilson (1990), Kaplan and Reishus (1990), Brickley, Link, and Coles (1999), and Harford (2003) for more evidence that directors benefit from high firm performance.”
CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired? (2006, background): “…control plays an important disciplinary role, as managerial turnover is high in f rms that are targets of acquisitions, especially if their pre-acquisition performance is poor (Martin and McConnell (1991), Kini, Kracaw, and Mian (1995), Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999), and Harford (2003)).”
Busy Directors and Firm Performance: Evidence from Mergers (2018, unknown): “Aside from rare cases 3 , directors of the target firm “lose” their appointment (Harford, 2003).”
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (2014, unknown): “In addition, we contribute to the body of research on the labor market for directorships (e.g Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Gilson, 1990; Coles and Hoi, 2003; Harford, 2003; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007).”
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors (2010, unknown): “Further, being associated with failure in a director position should adversely affect his job opportunities (e.g., Harford (2003) and Yermack (2004)).”
Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth (2007, unknown): “Outside directors hold fewer board seats after serving in dividend-reducing firms (Kaplan and Reishus (1990)), in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson (1990)), in firms that are liquidated (Harford (2003)), and in firms that perform poorly (Yermack (2004)).”
The Effect of Compensation Committee Quality on the Association between CEO Cash Compensation and Accounting Performance (2009, methodology): “Prior research (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999; Harford, 2003) provides evidence that directors with more additional board appointments will be better monitors of managerial decisions.”
Board Structure, Mergers and Shareholder Wealth: A Study of the Mutual Fund Industry (2007, background): “For example, Harford (2003) concludes that loss of directorship income leads outside directors to resist possible acquisitions that are in”