Managerial Incentives, Capital Reallocation, and the Business Cycle

By Andrea L. Eisfeldt, Adriano A. Rampini. 2008

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eb60254d13f3e5e3c65f489b9a087c87d7632e87

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Citations in the corpus

The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion (2011, background): “15 have recently attracted attention in the literature as a potential business cycle driver (see Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010, 2011); Fisher (2006)).”
CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework (2013, unknown): “Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) show how aggregate business cycle conditions can drive CEO turnover and compensation in a principal agent environment where managers have private information about their skill.”
Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance (2010, background): “12Similar to us, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008) provide a model of a CEO who has private information about asset productivity and is charged with optimal capital reallocation decisions.”
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World (2012, methodology): “By verifying the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 2, we now show (32)By inspecting the formula for the xed component St( ) in (8), one can verify that when either (i) the support of the transitory noise distribution is bounded and the level of the outside option U is su¢ ciently large, or ”
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008, unknown): “By simple substitution in Proposition 2, it is easy to see that (13) holds if and only if z − r − δ > 0, (14)”
Really Uncertain Business Cycles (2012, unknown): “Engle and Rangel (2006) look at data from 48 countries (developed and developing) and find similar results for this panel (stock market volatility is significantly higher when GDP growth is low).”
CEO Replacement under Private Information (2010, background): “4 In Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), the manager’s desire to become entrenched arises from exogenous private benefits of control, whereas in our model the CEO’s desire to become entrenched arises endogenously from the promise of quasi rents in the form of generous on-the-job pay, which is necessary to ”