Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis

By J. Dahya, O. Dimitrov, John J. McConnell. 2008

681 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01f72f1cf74aa86bf419c6f71a96262dc60c4250

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Boards: Does One Size Fit All? (2008, neutral): “Following Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2007) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), we use lagged values of Q as the dependent variable.”
Family Control and Financing Decisions (2011, neutral): “(1999), Faccio and Lang (2002), Dahya et al.(2008), Maury (2006), Laeven and Levin (2009).”
Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (2007, positive): “, 2004; Dahya et al., 2008), we use country random effects because the investor protection explanatory variables have no within-country variation, thus precluding the use of country fixed effects. Also, our sample is a sub-sample of the total population of companies within each country and a random ”
Corporate Boards, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in an Environment of Severe Political and Economic Crisis (2012, neutral): “These results are consistent with Ho and Williams (2003), but contradict other studies (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Dahya et al., 2008).”
Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China (2012, background): “Numerous studies are devoted to investigating the relation between corporate governance structure and firm performance (e.g., Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Dahya et al., 2008; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004).”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, neutral): “Beginning with Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), many other, such as Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay (2003), Love (2003), Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) and Moyen (2004), have provided empirical evidence of a strong positive relation between the level of inve”
Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, positive): “This latter result supports the idea that firms more likely to issue equity are more concerned with protecting shareholders through rules of governance (Dahya et al., 2008).”
Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends (2009, background): “Dahya et al. (2008) argue that although the dominant shareholders can remove independent directors just as easily they appoint them, they should consider the costs of replacement of independent directors.”